Migration in the 21st Century: reflections & prospects for 2050 The Director General of IOM, Ambassador

William Lacy Swing, participated in the conference "Migration in the 21st Century: reflections and prospects for 2050” at the Palais d'Egmont in Brussels on 17 May 2016.

This conference, organized by the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, coincides with the celebration of the 65th anniversary of IOM and the Belgian presidency of the IOM Council.

Pictures of the event are available on our Flickr album, and a short video report can be accessed here.

For more info, visit our website

CrisisWatch is a monthly early warning bulletin designed to provide a regular update on the state of the most significant situations of conflict around the world.

Global Overview, August 2016

The month saw Yemen’s peace talks collapse with violence there intensifying, and the Syrian conflict escalate following Ankara’s launch of a cross-border ground offensive against Islamic State (IS) and Kurdish forces, days after a major terror attack in Turkey’s south east. Troop deployments in Western Sahara threatened to bring about clashes, and violence flared in the Central African Republic. In Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, security forces brutally suppressed anti-government protests, while in Gabon, the president’s disputed re-election triggered violent clashes. In Asia, a suicide bombing killed over 70 people in Pakistan, while suspected militants in Thailand’s southern insurgency launched attacks on targets outside the traditional conflict zone. In positive news, peace talks between the Philippines government and communist rebel groups resumed after a four-year hiatus. On 24 August, Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) declared that they had reached a final peace accord, paving the way for an end to 52 years of armed conflict.

Global Overview OCTOBER 2016

October saw Venezuela’s tense political standoff at new heights amid economic stress and popular unrest, and Haiti’s weak political and security equilibrium struck by a major natural disaster and humanitarian crisis. In Africa, violence worsened in the Central African Republic (CAR), north-eastern Kenya, Mozambique and western Niger, while in Ethiopia the government hardened its response to continued protests. In Myanmar, unprecedented attacks on police in the north triggered deadly clashes and displacement threatening to exacerbate intercommunal tensions across the country, while Russia’s North Caucasus saw an increase in conflict-related casualties, detentions and counter-terrorism operations. In the Middle East, the election of Michel Aoun as president of Lebanon signals a long-awaited breakthrough ending two years of political deadlock.

Global Overview NOVEMBER 2016

November saw violence escalate again in Syria, Myanmar, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Cameroon. Attacks by pro-regime forces on rebel strongholds in Syria resumed, causing significant civilian casualties. In Myanmar’s Rakhine state intensifying violence displaced tens of thousands of Rohingya Muslims, while a major attack by armed groups near the Chinese border threatened to undermine the country’s fragile ethnic peace process. In DRC, violence rose in the east and the regime continued to repress dissent, underscoring the risk that renewed protests, likely in December when President Kabila’s second term officially ends, could turn violent. In Cameroon, Boko Haram stepped up its attacks in the Far North and minority English-speakers clashed with security forces in the North West region. The victory of Donald Trump in the U.S. presidential election on 8 November created uncertainty about possible shifts in future U.S. foreign policy priorities and positions, including on a number of conflicts and prominent geostrategic arenas – among them the future of the historic multilateral nuclear accord with Iran.

Eastern Mediterranean Route

The number of people arriving by sea to Europe sizeably fell in 2016, with only 362,376 recorded arrivals compared to 1,014,973 in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016). Numbers migrating along the Eastern Mediterranean route have also substantially decreased. In 2016, only 173,450 people – compared to 856,723 last year – crossed over by sea from Turkey to Greece. In fact, 87% of those arrivals occurred during the first three months of the year, before the signing of the EU-Turkey Statement. In addition, the Turkish Coast Guards reported a decrease in the number of interceptions (833 compared to 2,430 last year) and apprehensions (down by 60%) in 2016. Despite the reduction in arrivals, total figures for 2016 remain 3 times higher than yearly average arrivals between 2008-2014. According to IOM, as of February 8, 2017 approximately 74,909 refugees and migrants are stranded at the borders of Greece and the Western Balkans. In fact, this buildup has been gradually increasing as border controls across Europe have tightened even further. Since the March 2016, those stranded at the Greek and Bulgarian borders have increased by 47% and 443% respectively.

EU-Turkey Statement

As of February 2017, 894 people have been returned to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Statement and 386 under the already existing Greece-Turkey readmission agreement as of January 2017. Asylum seekers in Greece can be returned to Turkey if they do not apply for asylum or withdraw an asylum application in Greece; opt for an assisted return; after a negative asylum claim; and, lastly, when an asylum claim has been found ‘inadmissible’ – that is, on the grounds that Turkey is either a ‘safe first country’ (where a person has been recognised as a refugee or otherwise enjoys sufficient protection) or a ‘safe third country’ (namely, that Turkey can provide protection to the returned person).
Turkey’s status as a ‘safe third country’ has however been challenged in Greek courts throughout the year. In February 2017, the Greek Council of State (the Supreme Administrative Court) unanimously rejected two separate appeal cases by concluding that Turkey qualifies as a safe third country. For the moment, the issue has been referred to the grand Chamber of the Court for further consideration, where a final decision is expected to be made. However, if approved, the decision could potentially open the door for an accelerated returns process that would significantly increase the number of returnees from the EU.

Restrictions at the Turkish-Syrian border

Border restrictions continued in 2016 with Turkish Land Forces apprehending 424,641 individuals, 80% at the Syrian border. Construction of a concrete wall along the 911km Turkish-Syrian border continues, with plans to complete it by end of 2017. Of the nineteen official border crossing points between the two countries, only two (Cilvegozu and Oncupinar) are currently open for Syrians with emergency medical health needs. Despite the number of registered Syrians in Turkey rising to 2,841,036, there is a modest trend in return figures as 23,926 Syrians were reported to have returned to Jarablus during the last quarter of 2016. The Turkish government continues to advocate for a safe zone in Northern Syria where Syrians can return to, the latest effort through involvement in the evacuation of Eastern Aleppo and the construction of IDP camps in Idlib, Syria aimed at stemming flows into Turkey. This policy of assisting displaced populations within Syria is mostly evident in Jarablus and Azaz where Turkish authorities have increased reconstruction efforts aimed at laying the groundwork for voluntary return.

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the General Assembly the report of the Director-General of the World Health Organization, submitted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 70/300.

Report of the Director-General of the World Health Organization on consolidating gains and accelerating efforts to control and eliminate malaria in developing countries, particularly in Africa, by 2030

Summary

The present report is submitted in response to General Assembly resolution 70/300. It provides a review of progress in the implementation of the resolution, focusing on the adoption and scaling-up of interventions recommended by the World Health Organization in malaria-endemic countries. It provides an assessment of progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals and resolution 70/300. It elaborates on the challenges limiting the full achievement of the targets, and provides recommendations to ensure that progress is accelerated towards the goals of the Global Technical Strategy for Malaria 2016-2030 in the coming years.

I. Introduction

1. While malaria is a preventable and treatable disease, it continues to have a devastating impact on people’s health and livelihoods around the world. There were an estimated 212 million malaria cases and an estimated 429,000 deaths from malaria globally in 2015, with 70 per cent of these deaths occurring among children under 5 years of age in sub-Saharan Africa. The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends a multi-pronged strategy to reduce the malaria burden, including vector control interventions, preventive therapies, diagnostic testing, quality-assured treatment and strong malaria surveillance.

2. The present report highlights progress and challenges in the control and elimination of malaria in the context of General Assembly resolution 70/300, drawing on the World Malaria Report 2016, issued by WHO in December 2016. The analysis is based on the latest available comprehensive data (2015) received from malaria-endemic countries and organizations supporting global malaria efforts. Data from 2016 are currently being collected and reviewed by WHO.

3. Between 2000 and 2015, malaria received worldwide recognition as a priority global health issue. Under the umbrella of the Roll Back Malaria Partnership, endemic countries, United Nations agencies, bilateral donors, public-private partnerships, scientific organizations, academic institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector worked together to scale up WHO-recommended interventions, harmonize activities and improve strategic planning, programme management and funding availability. Together with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and other neglected tropical diseases, malaria control was included under Goal 3, target 3, of the Sustainable Development Goals, which aims to “end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other neglected tropical diseases” by the year 2030. WHO interprets this target as the attainment of the targets of the Global Technical Strategy for Malaria 2016-2030. The Global Technical Strategy sets the target of reducing the malaria disease burden by at least 40 per cent by 2020 and by at least 90 per cent by 2030. It also aims to eliminate the disease in at least 35 new countries by 2030.

4. The success of efforts to control and eliminate malaria is measured through an analysis of trends in the disease burden and intervention scale-up, and a review of progress made towards the global goals and targets of the Global Technical Strategy, which were agreed through a broad, consultative process.

The year opened with a worsening of the ongoing conflicts in Yemen, Nigeria and Ukraine, each with potentially major regional implications. Violence escalated in Sudan, as well as in Lebanon's Tripoli and along its southern border with Israel, and a deadly clash between police and militants in the southern Philippines threatened to derail the peace process there. In South Asia, both Bangladesh and Nepal saw political tensions intensify. On a positive note, the Sri Lanka elections resulted in a peaceful transition of power from long-time President Mahinda Rajapaksa to Maithripala Sirisena, despite initial fears of election-related violence.

Yemen’s downward spiral took yet another dramatic turn. President Hadi and the government resigned on 22 January after Huthi rebels consolidated control over Sanaa and put Hadi under virtual house arrest. The entire political process established with the signing of a UN-backed peace and power-sharing agreement in September has been thrown into question, raising the prospect of territorial fragmentation, economic meltdown and widespread violence – as outlined in our Conflict Alert. There is little external actors can do at this point, except possibly Saudi Arabia and Iran, to influence Yemen’s internal political dynamics. The Huthis have set a 4 February deadline for all parties to reach a power-sharing agreement or they will assume control of the state through a “revolutionary leadership”. Yemen again made international headlines for its connection with global terrorism as al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Yemen’s local branch, claimed responsibility for the 7 January Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris.

The significant increase in Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria’s north throughout 2014 was compounded by what may have been the insurgent group’s deadliest attack yet. Reports suggest in early January they killed anywhere between 150 and 2,500 civilians in Borno state. As the February elections loom, there is a danger that ongoing insecurity in the north could worsen potential political violence and undermine the credibility of the polls, as discussed in our recent report on violence and the elections.

The most intense fighting for many months in eastern Ukraine resulted in heavy civilian and military casualties and a significant increase in internally displaced civilians, and further undermined peace talks. It also led to heightened concern in Western capitals that Russia has not abandoned the idea of open military intervention. The stated aim of the separatists is to seize the totality of Donetsk oblast, but there is so far no conclusive change in the balance of military power in the east. The possibility of a resumption of full-fledged hostilities, and the risk of a humanitarian crisis during winter, were discussed in our recent report. Without immediate and forceful international intervention to end the fighting, the current offensive could herald the beginning of a new and very costly military conflict.

As anticipated last month, violence once again increased in Sudan following the collapse of peace talks between the government and rebel groups in Darfur, Blue Nile and South Kordofan, as both sides launched major offensives in the disputed areas. (See our new report). In late January, a Hizbollah attack on an Israeli military convoy along Lebanon’s southern border – retaliation for an Israeli airstrike that killed six of its fighters in the Golan Heights – caused fears of an impending all-out confrontation, although both parties said they wanted to avoid a costly escalation. Earlier in January, a deadly suicide attack in Tripoli shook the relative calm that had prevailed in the city for months. In the southern Philippines, 44 police and at least seven civilians were killed in a clash between police and MILF militants, undermining support for last year’s historical peace agreement between the government and the longstanding rebel group at a critical time in its implementation.

In South Asia, the first anniversary of Bangladesh’s disputed January 2014 elections saw dozens killed in clashes between government and opposition groups, and marked the start of a new phase of the political deadlock between the ruling Awami League and opposition Bangladesh National Party. Tensions between Nepal’s political parties worsened when they failed to reach consensus on a draft constitution before a self-imposed 22 January deadline. Sri Lanka’s long-time President Mahinda Rajapaksa surprised many observers when he conceded defeat to opposition candidate Maithripala Sirisena in the 8 January presidential election, following a largely peaceful election day. Sirisena has promised reform, including more meaningful devolution of power and accountability. However, international pressure and support will be needed for those promises to be met and the political transition to succeed (as discussed in our recent briefing).

August 2015 – Trends

• Deteriorated situations

Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Colombia/Venezuela, Guatemala, Kashmir, Lebanon, Nepal, Yemen

• Improved situations

Guinea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka

September 2015 – Watchlist

• Conflict risk alerts

Colombia/Venezuela, Guatemala, Iraq, Nepal, Yemen

• Conflict resolution opportunities

  South Sudan

September 2015 – Trends

• Deteriorated situations
  Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Mozambique, Somalia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Yemen

• Improved situations
  Colombia, Guatemala, Macedonia

October 2015 – Watchlist

• Conflict risk alerts
  Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic

• Conflict resolution opportunities
  Colombia

October 2015 – Trends

• Deteriorated situations
  Central African Republic, Israel/Palestine, Macedonia, Republic of Congo, South China Sea, Turkey

• Improved situations
  Iran

November 2015 – Watchlist
- Conflict risk alerts
Turkey

• Conflict resolution opportunities

November 2015– Trends

Deteriorated situations

Bangladesh, France, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nepal, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela

Improved situations

Burkina Faso, Myanmar

December 2015– Watchlist

Conflict risk alerts

Venezuela

• Conflict resolution opportunities

December 2015 – Trends

- Deteriorated situations

Afghanistan, Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Niger

- Improved situations

January 2016 – Watchlist

- Conflict risk alerts

Burundi

- Conflict resolution opportunities

Libya

Genetic diversity of livestock can help feed a hotter, harsher world

Despite growing interest in safeguarding biodiversity of livestock and poultry,genetic erosion continues

27 January 2016, Rome - Livestock keepers and policy makers worldwide are increasingly interested in harnessing animal biodiversity to improve production and food security on a warmer, more crowded planet, according to a new FAO report issued today. The agency nonetheless warns that many valuable animal breeds continue to be at risk and calls for stronger efforts to use the pool of genetic resources sustainably.

According to The Second Report on the State of the World's Animal Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, some 17 percent (1,458) of the world's farm animal breeds are currently at risk of extinction, while the risk status of many others (58 percent) is simply unknown due to a lack of data on the size and structure of their populations. Nearly 100 livestock breeds have gone extinct between 2000 and 2014.

Country data shows that indiscriminate cross-breeding is considered as the main cause of genetic erosion. Other common threats to animal genetic diversity are the increasing use of non-native breeds, weak policies and institutions regulating the livestock sector, the decline of traditional livestock production systems, and the neglect of breeds considered not competitive enough.

Europe and the Caucasus, and North America are the two areas in the world with the highest proportion of at-risk breeds. In absolute terms, the highest number of at-risk breeds can be found in Europe and the Caucasus.

Both areas are characterized by highly specialized livestock industries that tend to use only a small number of breeds for production.

Why biodiversity matters

Genetic diversity provides the raw material for farmers and pastoralists to improve their breeds and adapt livestock populations to changing environments and changing demands.

"For thousands of years, domesticated animals, like sheep, chickens and camels, have contributed directly to the livelihoods and food security of millions of people," said FAO Director General José Graziano da Silva, "That includes some 70 percent of the world's rural poor today."

"Genetic diversity is a prerequisite for adaptation in the face of future challenges", according to the Director-General, who added that the report will "underpin renewed efforts to ensure that animal genetic resources are used and developed to promote global food security, and remain available for future generations."

Among the future challenges are climate change, emerging diseases, pressure on land and water, and shifting market demands, which make it more important than ever to ensure animal genetic resources are conserved and used sustainably.

Currently, some 38 species and 8,774 separate breeds of domesticated birds and mammals are used in agriculture and food production.

Rise in national gene banks and improved management

A total of 129 countries participated in the new global assessment, which follows nearly a decade after the release of the first global assessment of animal genetic resources in 2007.

"The data we've collected suggests there's been improvement in the number of at-risk breeds since the first assessment," says Beate Scherf, Animal Production Officer at FAO and co-author of the report. "And governments overall have definitely stepped up efforts to halt genetic erosion and more sustainably manage their national livestock breeds."

The study finds that governments are increasingly recognizing the importance of sustainably using and developing the genetic resources embodied in livestock.

When FAO published the first global assessment in 2007, fewer than 10 countries reported having established a gene bank. That number has now risen to 64 countries, and an additional 41 countries are planning to establish such a gene bank, according to the new report.

And these efforts are bearing fruit, experts say: "Over the last decade, countries across Europe have invested heavily in building shared information systems and gene banks as security measures," according to Scherf.

Regional collaborations like the new European Gene Bank Network (EUGENA) are key to managing and improving breeds in the future, she says, and should be supported by in situ conservation of live animals in their natural habitat.

In situ conservation also recognizes the cultural and environmental value of keeping live populations of diverse animal breeds.

Some 177 countries additionally have appointed National Coordinators and 78 have set up multi-stakeholder advisory groups to aid national efforts to better manage animal genetic resources.

Increasing global trade in animal genetic resources

This comes at a time of expansion in the global trade in breeding animals and livestock semen, often for cross-breeding purposes, with many developing countries emerging as significant importers and some also as exporters of genetic material.

Increasingly, farmers and policy makers in developing countries have embraced imports of genetic material as a way to enhance the productivity of their livestock populations - growing their milk output, for example, or decreasing the time needed for an animal to reach maturity.

But if not well planned, cross-breeding can fail to significantly improve productivity and lead to the loss of valuable characteristics such as the special ability to cope with extremes of temperature, limited water supplies, poor-quality feed, rough terrain, high altitudes and other challenging aspects of the production environment.

Challenges to management of genetic resources

In order to better manage livestock diversity going forward, animal breeds and their production environment need to be better described, according to the report, which shows genetic resources are frequently lost when limited knowledge leads to certain breeds going underused.

More also needs to be done to monitor population trends and emerging threats to diversity, according to the report.

Trendspotting will be critical

Among the major changes to the sector over the last decades has been the rapid expansion of large-scale high-input livestock production systems in parts of the developing world, accompanied by growing pressures on natural resources.

South Asia and Africa -two very resource-constrained regions that are home to many small-scale livestock keepers and a diverse range of animal genetic resources - are projected to become the main centres of growth in meat and milk consumption.

Trends like these are grounds for concern because similar rises in demand in other regions have come with a shift away from small-scale production that supports local genetic diversity to large-scale production that is more likely to use a limited number of breeds and can create major challenges for the sustainable use of animal genetic resources.

Changes in food systems are among trends that should be carefully tracked to predict their impact on demand for particular species and breeds, according to the report, along technology, climate changes and government policies.

Need for greater international collaboration

At the same time, the report stresses that international cooperation remains an area requiring improvement in order to support future livestock biodiversity.

Since 2007, countries have been implementing the Global Plan of Action for Animal Genetic Resources, the first internationally agreed framework of its kind.

But international collaboration remains relatively underdeveloped among countries implementing the Plan, the report cautions. Cooperation should be stepped up to move beyond the limited number of bilateral and regional research programs that are currently in place.

The month saw an intensification of Yemen’s war, amid heightened regional rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran complicating prospects for peace. Political tensions increased in Haiti, Guinea-Bissau and Moldova, where protests over endemic corruption and a lack of confidence in the government could escalate. In Africa, Boko Haram’s deadly attacks increased in northern Cameroon, and Burkina Faso was hit by an unprecedented terror attack. On the nuclear front, in East Asia, North Korea’s announcement that it had carried out a successful hydrogen bomb test was roundly condemned, while nuclear-related sanctions on Iran were rolled back in accordance with the July 2015 deal.

The month saw conflict continue to rage in Turkey’s south east between Ankara and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), looking likely to further escalate in March. Afghanistan and Somalia both saw armed insurgencies capture new territories. In Africa, political tensions rose in Chad, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, while in Venezuela, deadlock between the opposition-held parliament and government has brought the country closer to political and economic implosion. In Asia, North Korea’s announcement of a satellite launch in violation of UN Security Council resolutions prompted international condemnation and calls for tough new sanctions. On a positive note, the coming month brings the possibility of a final agreement to end Colombia’s decades-old insurgency.

The month saw violent extremist movements, including the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda-linked groups, carry out major deadly attacks in Turkey, Pakistan, Côte d’Ivoire, Tunisia and Belgium. In Libya, the arrival of Prime Minister Serraj in Tripoli despite warnings from multiple factions could lead to further destabilisation. Meanwhile in Central Africa, political violence rose in Burundi and could break out in Chad around the 10 April presidential election. Yemen, South Sudan and even Syria saw progress, of varying degrees, toward peace talks or implementation of agreements, and in Colombia the start of talks between the state and the National Liberation Army (ELN) could lead to the end of the 52-year-old conflict.

In Libya, international recognition of the new UN-backed Government of National Accord without support from military factions or the Tobruk-based House of Representatives worsened tensions in an already fragmented security landscape, and Prime Minister Serraj’s arrival in Tripoli on 30 March could trigger worse violence in April. Meanwhile, an IS branch is reportedly gaining strength. To prevent further splintering of Libya’s armed groups and ensure that political and security developments support a negotiated peace, Crisis Group has called for a nationwide security track dialogue in parallel with the UN-guided political track. In Tunisia, at least 50 IS militants stormed Ben Guerdane, 30km from the Libyan border on 7 March, attempting to overwhelm key security installations.

In Turkey, a car bomb attack on 13 March in Ankara saw 38 killed including two assailants. The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK), an ultra-radical Kurdish nationalist offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), claimed responsibility, saying it was an act of revenge for ongoing security operations against the PKK in south-eastern urban centres. As Crisis Group has long argued, the only way toward a durable solution is peace talks with the PKK alongside ensuring further democratic rights for Turkey’s Kurdish population.

Elsewhere, violent extremist movements carried out major deadly attacks. In Pakistan, over 70 people were killed in a suicide bombing claimed by the Pakistani Taliban faction Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JA) in Lahore on 27 March. In Belgium 32 people were killed by two IS-linked suicide bomb attacks at the main airport and on the Brussels metro on 22 March, while in Côte d’Ivoire on 13 March gunmen shot dead sixteen civilians in Grand-Bassam, 40km east of Abidjan, in an unprecedented terrorist attack claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Crisis Group’s Special Report Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State examines how such extremist movements benefit from today’s deadliest crises and complicate efforts to end them.

In Burundi, political violence worsened while international pressure on President Nkurunziza failed to stop government repression. There were deadly attacks on three officials including two from the ruling party and the assassination of two high-ranking army officers on the same day, pointing to dangerous divisions in the military. According to the UN, 474 people have been killed in political violence since April 2015, and over 250,000 Burundians have fled to neighbouring states. In Chad, mounting protests against President Déby’s regime and government repression could lead to serious political violence around the presidential election, scheduled for 10 April. Meanwhile, tensions between Morocco and the UN spiked after UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon referred to the “occupation” of Western Sahara during a visit to the region in early March.

In Syria, Russia’s announcement that it would withdraw the “main part” of its assets that have conducted operations in the country since September 2015 strengthened the ongoing UN-brokered talks, which resumed on 14 March in Geneva. Since the “cessation of hostilities” that began on 27 February violence has decreased considerably, according to local sources, with the lowest monthly civilian death toll in four years. Meanwhile, in Yemen, the agreement between Saudi Arabia and the Huthis to halt hostilities along the Yemen-Saudi Arabia border in early March paved the way for commitments to a wider ceasefire and peace talks to start in April. Fighting continued, nevertheless, including between government forces and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Aden and IS-linked attacks in the south.

In South Sudan, amid a decline in fighting, April could see significant progress toward the formation of a transitional government of national unity, bringing the country a step closer toward implementation of the August 2015 peace deal. In Colombia, in a welcome step, the government and the National Liberation Army (ELN) announced on 30 March the opening of formal peace talks which, together with those nearing completion with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Havana, are the greatest opportunity to end 52 years of armed conflict.

The month saw fighting escalate again in Syria and Afghanistan, and erupt in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces. In Bangladesh, election violence and killings by extremist groups showed how new heights of government-opposition rivalry and state repression have benefitted violent political party wings and extremist groups alike. Political tensions intensified in Iraq and Macedonia, and security forces severely supressed opposition protests in the Republic of Congo and Gambia. On a positive note, new governments were formed in the Central African Republic and South Sudan to consolidate peace gains, and talks to end Yemen’s one-year-old civil war got underway, albeit later than planned.

In Syria, the fragile “cessation of hostilities” which began on 27 February collapsed in the north of the country and UN-brokered talks in Geneva unravelled. Violence escalated in Aleppo, where over 250 people were reported killed by days of regime and rebel bombardments starting on 22 April. That the truce lasted as long as it did shows the positive potential the U.S.-Russian partnership can play; its collapse, however, illustrates the limits of that partnership so long as differences over the ultimate ends persist, and support from regional actors, in particular Iran and Saudi Arabia, remains limited at best. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the launch of the Taliban’s spring offensive led to major clashes in several provinces, further dimming hopes of insurgents’ participation in peace efforts and contributing to increasingly strained relations between Kabul and Islamabad. On 19 April, the Taliban detonated a car bomb and launched a gun attack on the National Directorate of Security office, killing 64 in the deadliest insurgent attack on Kabul since 2001.

In the South Caucasus, heavy fighting erupted between Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh on 2 April, claiming dozens of lives in the most serious escalation since the 1994 ceasefire. Each side accused the other of instigating the outbreak of fighting, and clashes continued across the line of contact despite the declaration of a Russian-brokered truce on 5 April. Crisis Group has cautioned that “there is a strong risk fighting will resume periodically, both to challenge the status quo on the ground and to attract diplomatic attention”, and called for the OSCE Minsk process to be re-energised through sustained high-level political leadership.

Several brutal murders in Bangladesh, including the killing of law student and secular blogger Nazimuddin Samad on 6 April, underscored the growing power and impunity of violent extremist groups. As the political rivalry between the ruling Awami League (AL) party and opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) continues to intensify, violent clashes around the second phase of the local elections also persisted, leaving more than 30 party activists reported killed. On 11 April, Crisis Group warned that the political conflict has resulted in “high levels of violence and a brutal state response”, calling for a strengthening and depoliticisation of all aspects of the criminal justice system to restore stability and ensure security.

In Iraq, Prime Minister Abadi’s failure to push his cabinet reshuffle through parliament, blocked by over 100 protesting parliamentarians, angered public opinion to such an extent that crowds of demonstrators broke into the fortified Green Zone on 30 April, prompting authorities to declare a state of emergency. Macedonia’s political crisis worsened as the opposition Social Democrats announced on 6 April that they would boycott the 5 June parliamentary elections due to the government’s failure to implement media reforms and clean up the electoral roll. The president’s decision to pardon all politicians facing criminal investigations for their alleged role in illegal wiretapping triggered days of protests in the capital and elsewhere.

In Africa, the Republic of Congo saw government forces continue to crack down on protests against President Sassou-Nguesso’s disputed 20 March re-election. When on 4 April they met armed resistance in a southern Brazzaville opposition stronghold, at least seventeen people were killed. The next day the government began airstrikes in the south which it said targeted former rebel bases. In Gambia, security forces broke up peaceful demonstrations calling for electoral reform and free speech on 14 April, arresting at least 50 protestors. The news that one arrested senior opposition official had been tortured to death sparked more protests and high-level arrests.

In a major step forward, after more than three years of turmoil, the Central African Republic’s newly-elected President Touadéra appointed his prime minister, who in turn chose a new government. Likewise South Sudan inched closer to implementing its August 2015 peace agreement when on 26 April Riek Machar, leader of the armed opposition (SPLM/A-IO), returned to Juba and was appointed first vice president. Two days later a transitional government was formed.

In Yemen, although fighting continued, UN-sponsored talks between President Hadi’s government and the Huthi/Saleh bloc – which got off to a stuttering start on 21 April – offer the best chance to end the war that began over a year ago and should be actively supported by all sides.

The month saw Venezuela’s political, economic and humanitarian crisis worsen amid heightened tensions between the government and opposition, a situation which could lead to state collapse and regional destabilisation. Another major setback in electing a new president in Haiti prompted fears of further civil unrest. In West Africa, deadly violence in central Mali and south-east Nigeria spiked, while a power struggle in Guinea-Bissau led to a dangerous standoff. In Libya, factions for and against the fledgling Government of National Accord (GNA) advanced on Sirte to expel the Islamic State (IS), risking clashes over oil facilities, while Turkey saw heightened political polarisation and an increase in violence in Kurdish areas. Ongoing peace talks, despite slow progress and ongoing violence, remain the best chance to end major combat in Yemen.

In Venezuela, political tensions between the government led by President Maduro and the opposition Democratic Unity (MUD) alliance over attempts to trigger a presidential recall referendum intensified. Maduro’s decision on 16 May to issue a wide-ranging State of Exception and Economic Emergency decree suspending constitutional guarantees in order to combat what he called attempts by the opposition and foreign allies to overthrow the government was firmly condemned by the opposition. Senior opposition leader Henrique Capriles called on Venezuelans not to obey it, and told Maduro to “bring out the tanks” if he intended to enforce it. He warned the army to choose between allegiance to Maduro or the constitution. Public anger over the lack of food and other basic goods grew, with increased incidents of looting. Members of the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) met on 1 June to discuss the deteriorating situation in Venezuela, after the OAS secretary general invoked the Inter-American Democratic Charter. Crisis Group has called on Latin American leaders to support international mediation if genuine political dialogue between the two sides is not in sight.

Elsewhere in the region, a commission finding that Haiti’s long-delayed presidential election last October was marred by massive irregularities and must be held again threw the country into further uncertainty and prompted fears of civil unrest in the weeks to come.

In West Africa, Mali’s central Mopti region saw a rise in clashes between ethnic Fulani and Bambara armed groups, while suspected jihadists launched several attacks on the army and international forces there, together leaving some 35 dead. Meanwhile, violence continued in the north in part as armed groups jostled to benefit from the promised disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration program – a critical component of the June 2015 Bamako peace accord. In Guinea-Bissau, the power struggle between President Vaz and the dominant faction of the ruling African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) worsened. On 26 May, Vaz decided to create a “government of presidential initiative” and appointed PAIGC dissident Baciro Djá as the new Prime Minister. The mainstream PAIGC rejected the move as unconstitutional and called for protests which led to clashes between protestors and security forces.

In Nigeria, while ongoing army operations seem to have the Boko Haram jihadist insurgency on the back foot in the north east, security problems elsewhere have worsened. In the Niger Delta, the little-known militant group Niger Delta Avengers claimed six attacks on major oil and gas facilities, which significantly cut the country’s oil output and electricity supply. In the wider south east, security forces fought Biafran separatists in several cities on 30 May, leaving at least twenty dead, and in the centre, clashes between farmers and Fulani herdsmen killed at least 28. As Crisis Group has warned, unless the Buhari government explores existing political mechanisms to address discontent in the south east, Niger Delta and elsewhere, its gains against Boko Haram will be short-lived and the country could face even more deadly violence.

In Libya, west-based factions supporting the nascent Government of National Accord (GNA) and east-based factions opposing it mobilised troops, ostensibly to retake Sirte from the Islamic State (IS). Their advance could lead to worse fighting in the coming weeks over control of oil facilities in the Gulf of Sirte area. Despite international support for Prime Minister-designate Faez Serraj and the UN-backed Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), there is still much animosity in the east toward the LPA and Serraj and growing support for General Haftar’s rival Libyan National Army (LNA) after its recent military advances in Benghazi and Derna.

Meanwhile, in Turkey, the abrupt departure of Prime Minister Davutoğlu raised concerns about increasing political polarisation, amid signs that further moves are imminent to consolidate President Erdoğan’s de facto leading executive role. The lifting of immunities of parliamentarians facing criminal charges, which could lead to the expulsion of People’s Democratic Party (HDP) MPs from parliament, alongside an increase in civilian casualties from Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) attacks in the south east, make the return to negotiations between the Kurdish movement and Turkey’s political leadership even more remote.

In Yemen, repeated ceasefire violations by Huthi/Saleh forces and government troops backed by the Saudi-led coalition, and the coalition’s dangerous military build-up east of the capital, threatened the peace talks in Kuwait. Yet, slow progress aside, the UN-backed talks remain the best chance to end major combat and restart a meaningful political process.

Strategic Assessment

The global terrorist threat continued to evolve rapidly in 2015, becoming increasingly decentralized and diffuse. Terrorist groups continued to exploit an absence of credible and effective state institutions, where avenues for free and peaceful expression of opinion were blocked, justice systems lacked credibility, and where security force abuses and government corruption went unchecked.

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) remained the greatest threat globally, maintaining a formidable force in Iraq and Syria, including a large number of foreign terrorist fighters. ISIL’s capacity and territorial control in Iraq and Syria reached a high point in spring 2015, but began to erode over the second half of 2015. ISIL did not have a significant battlefield victory in Iraq and Syria after May. At the end of 2015, 40 percent of the territory ISIL controlled at the beginning of the year had been liberated. In Syria, local forces expelled ISIL fighters from several key cities along the routes connecting the two ISIL strongholds of Raqqa and Mosul, and reclaimed about 11 percent of the territory ISIL once controlled. These losses demonstrated the power of coordinated government action to mobilize against and confront terrorism.

ISIL’s loss of territory it governs and controls in Iraq and Syria in 2015 also diminished funds available to it. ISIL relies heavily on extortion and the levying of “taxes” on local populations under its control, as well as a range of other sources, such as oil smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, looting, antiquities theft and smuggling, foreign donations, and human trafficking.

Coalition airstrikes targeted ISIL’s energy infrastructure – modular refineries, petroleum storage tanks, and crude oil collection points – as well as bulk cash storage sites. These airstrikes have significantly degraded ISIL’s ability to generate revenue. The United States led the international effort, including through the UN, to confront ISIL’s oil smuggling and its antiquities dealing, delivering additional blows to its financial infrastructure.

Toward the end of 2015, ISIL fighters conducted a series of external attacks in France, Lebanon, and Turkey, demonstrating the organization’s capabilities to carry out deadly plots beyond Iraq and Syria and also exposing weakness in international border security measures and systems. These attacks may also have been staged in an effort to assert a narrative of victory in the face of steady losses of territory in Iraq and Syria.

Along with ISIL, al-Qa’ida (AQ), and both groups’ branches increased their focus on staging mass-casualty attacks. This included attacks on international hotel chains in Burkina Faso,Mali, and Tunisia; other popular public locations; and the bombing of a Russian passenger plane. These plots were designed to undermine economic security, damage fragile economies, diminish confidence in governments, and foment further discord along religious and sectarian fault lines.

In 2015, ISIL abducted, systematically raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as eight years of age. Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIL fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or subjected to physical and sexual abuse. ISIL established “markets” where women and children were sold with price tags attached and has published a list of rules on how to treat female slaves once captured. Boko Haram has also abducted women and girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of whom it later subjected to domestic servitude, other forms of forced labor, and sexual servitude through forced marriages to its members.

Although ISIL did not claim responsibility, it was likely responsible for several attacks involving chemical-filled munitions in Iraq and Syria, including a sulfur mustard attack in Marea on August 21, 2015. The United States worked with the counter-ISIL coalition to dismantle this chemical weapons capability, as well as deny ISIL and other non-state actors access to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)-useable materials and expertise through interdictions and strengthening the ability of regional governments to detect, disrupt, and respond effectively to suspected CBRN activity.

While ISIL lost significant territory in Iraq and Syria during the second half of 2015, the group made gains in Libya amidst the instability there. According to open-source reporting, ISIL’s branch in Libya was estimated to have up to 5,000 terrorist fighters. The group expanded its territorial control in Sirte and its surrounding coastline. It also conducted attacks in Libya’s oil crescent and in Sabratha, near the border with Tunisia. However, ISIL also suffered losses in Libya in confrontations with militia groups, in particular in the eastern Libyan city of Darnah.

ISIL’s branch in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula (ISIL Sinai Province or ISIL-SP) increased its attacks against Egyptian security forces and become more sophisticated, exemplified by ISIL-SP’s multi-pronged attack in the North Sinai town of Sheikh Zuweid in July. The group also claimed responsibility for an operation that brought down Russian Metrojet 9286 in October 2015 that killed 224 passengers and seven crew members.

On January 26, 2015, ISIL publicly announced the establishment of an affiliate, known as ISIL Khorasan (ISIL-K), in Afghanistan and Pakistan. At year’s end, the group had focused the majority of its attacks against Afghan government and civilian targets, although the group has also claimed a small number of attacks in Pakistan’s settled areas. ISIL-K gained a small foothold in southern Nangarhar province in Afghanistan, but was significantly challenged by the Afghan government, Coalition Forces, and the Taliban, and had little support among the region’s population.

ISIL-aligned groups have also emerged in other parts of the Middle East, Africa, the Russian North Caucasus, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, although the relationship between most of these groups and ISIL’s leadership remained symbolic in most cases. Many of these groups are made up of pre-existing terrorist networkswith their own local goals and lesser capabilities than ISIL.

In March, the Nigeria-based terrorist group Boko Haram declared its affiliation to ISIL. During 2015, Boko Haram killed thousands of people and displaced hundreds of thousands in the Lake Chad Basin region of Africa. Regional military forces made progress during 2015 in degrading the group’s territorial control, in particular following the election of Nigerian President Buhari, but Boko Haram responded by increasing its use of asymmetric attacks. Of particular concern, Boko Haram continued and even increased its practice of using women and children as suicide bombers.

Beyond affiliated groups, ISIL was able to inspire attacks in 2015 by individuals or small groups of self-radicalized individuals in several cities around the world. ISIL’s propaganda and its use of social media have created new challenges for counterterrorism efforts.Private sector entities took proactive steps to deny ISIL the use of social media platforms by aggressive enforcement of violations to companies’ terms of service. Twitter reported in 2015 that it had begun suspending accounts for threatening or promoting terrorist attacks, primarily related to support for ISIL.

While AQ’s central leadership has been significantly weakened, the organization remained a threat and continued to serve as a focal point of inspiration for a network of affiliated groups, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP); al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); al-Nusrah Front; al-Shabaab, and al-Qa’ida in the Indian Subcontinent. The tensions between AQ and ISIL escalated in a number of regions during 2015 and likely resulted in increased violence in several parts of the world as AQ tried to reassert its relevance.

AQAP remained a significant threat to Yemen, the region, and to the United States, as efforts to counter the group were hampered by the ongoing conflict in that country. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Yemen also exploited the political and security vacuum to strengthen its foothold inside the country. Efforts by French and regional military forces – notably Chad and Niger – have significantly degraded the capacity of AQIM and al-Murabitun in northern Mali and across the wider Sahel. However, in 2015, these groups reverted to asymmetric warfare using remnant groups still located in northern Mali. AQIM increased its attacks on the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Toward the end of the year, AQIM also directed attacks on hotels in Mali and Burkina Faso.

In East Africa, al-Shabaab continued to commit deadly attacks in Somalia, seeking to reverse progress made by the Federal Government of Somalia and weaken the political will of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop contributing countries. In the first half of 2015, al-Shabaab launched attacks across the border in northern Kenya, including one against a university in Garissa in April that left nearly 150 people dead. While attacks in Kenya decreased in the second half of 2015, al-Shabaab reportedly maintained access to recruits and resources throughout southern and central Somalia.

Regional forces from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda continued to contribute troops to AMISOM in 2015 despite a number of mass-casualty attacks by al-Shabaab that killed hundreds of AMISOM soldiers. With U.S. support and in partnership with Somali forces, AMISOM maintained pressure on al-Shabaab and weakened the group’s territorial control in parts of Somalia. In particular, a coordinated operation by Ethiopian and Kenyan AMISOM forces pushed al-Shabaab from major strongholds in southern Somalia in the second half of 2015. However, al-Shabaab increased its attacks on AMISOM forward operating bases, resulting in increased AMISOM troop casualties and stalled offensive operations.

Global Overview – Trends and Outlook

While an upsurge of crises continued to test the international order, amid growing mass displacement and the spread of transnational terrorism, the UK's divisive vote on 23 June in favour of leaving the European Union brought a new dimension to global political and economic uncertainty. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, President & CEO of the International Crisis Group, said: “the Brexit crisis increases the risk of an inward-looking EU consumed with sorting out its own problems at a time when the world needs a Europe that is globally engaged".

The month saw security deteriorate in several countries in Africa. In South Sudan fighting escalated and the peace deal threatened to unravel, while Boko Haram increased deadly attacks in Niger. Insecurity also rose in Nigeria’s Niger Delta where militants fighting for a greater share of the region’s oil revenues stepped up attacks on oil and gas facilities, and communal and criminal violence spiked in the Central African Republic. In Turkey, a terrorist attack believed to be the work of Islamic State killed more than 40 people on 28 June. In a significant step forward, Colombia’s government and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) signed agreements bringing the 52-year armed conflict closer to an end.

In South Sudan, fighting erupted in several places and conflict parties failed to make progress in implementing the peace deal signed in August 2015, instead appearing to prepare for a return to war. Forces allied to the former rebels, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-In Opposition led by Vice President Riek Machar, launched attacks mid-month to demand places in the planned army integration or disarmament processes. Crisis Group has called on the peace guarantors to act urgently, ahead of the African Union summit on 10-18 July, to salvage the agreement and prevent the country from returning to full-scale war.

Meanwhile, in West Africa, armed violence in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta worsened and threatened to spread, while Boko Haram insurgents in the north east continued to attack security forces and civilians. These crises, alongside the killing of about 59 people by Fulani herdsmen on 18-19 June, painted a picture of deepening insecurity across the country. As Crisis Group argued in a new report “The Challenge of Military Reform”, if the government is to defend its citizens it needs to take action including an overhaul of the defence sector, drastically improving leadership, oversight and administration.

Niger also suffered deadly attacks by Boko Haram in south-eastern Diffa region on the border with Nigeria. On 3 June insurgents overran Bosso town on Lake Chad, killing 26 soldiers. Similar attacks were reported on 9 and 16 June against an army-held town and barracks. In the Central African Republic, violence spiked in several parts of the country in the first major deterioration in security since a newly elected government took office in April. In the capital, Bangui, clashes between Muslims and Christians on 11 June left four dead, and fighting hit the north west.

In Turkey a gun and suicide bomb attack at Istanbul’s Ataturk airport on 28 June killed 44 people and injured over 200. The government said it believed Islamic State (IS) was responsible, with official sources reporting that the three attackers were from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia’s North Caucasus. The attack comes as the government continued its clampdown against domestic IS networks and stepped up measures to prevent IS rocket attacks from Syria and seal off a 70km stretch of the border. Meanwhile clashes between the Kurdish PKK insurgency and Turkey’s security forces continued in the south east, with fighting increasingly moving from urban to rural areas.

On a positive note, the Colombian government and FARC signed agreements on the “end of conflict” on 23 June, providing the strongest assurance yet that the 52-year conflict is finally coming to a close. The agreements spell out how the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities will work, as well as how FARC guerillas will put down their arms and transition to civilian life. The parties also agreed on how to hold a referendum to approve the final peace deal. Crisis Group commended the work of both delegations and those involved in the negotiations, and applauded the inclusion of victims in the talks.